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Death of the image/the image of death: Temporality, torture and 
transience in Sunohara Yuuri and Akita Masami’s Harakiri Cycle 
Steve Jones, Northumbria University 
 
Abstract 
Sunohara Yuuri and Akita Masami’s series of six seppuku films (1990) are solely 
constituted by images of fictionalized death, revolving around the prolonged self-torture 
of a lone figure committing harakiri. I contend that the protagonist’s auto-immolation 
mirrors a formal death, each frame ‘killing’ the moment it represents. My analysis aims 
to explore how the solipsistic nature of selfhood is appositely symbolized by the isolation 
of the on-screen figures and the insistence with which the six films repeat the same 
scenario of protracted agony across the cycle. The centralization of suffering, I argue, 
parallels the distance between viewer and image with the isolating nature of embodied 
existence. Thus, this article seeks to probe the relationship between form and content, 
asking what the image of death reveals about the death of the image. 
Keywords: film, photography, pain, body, suicide, horror 
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The cycle of harakiri films made in 1990 and directed by Sunohara Yuuri (Onna harakiri: 
Sange, Jogakusei: Harakiri, Onna harakiri: Seisan, Shiro-shôzoku: Hara-kiri, Bijo kenshi: 
Futari seppuku), and the single entry directed by Akita Masami (‘Shitsurakuen’: Jôbafuku 
onna harakiri, also known as Lost Paradise) are solely constituted by fictional images of 
death. These ‘plotless’ videos revolve around the prolonged self-torture of a lone figure 
committing harakiri (ritualized suicide by blade). 
1 Since these films are relatively rare (Unearthed Films released a DVD box-set of the 
films, limited to only 1000 copies), it is probably worth expanding on the content in 
detail to evince the plotlessness to which I refer. In Onna harakiri: Sange (which is 
indicative of the content of the rest of the series) we encounter a lone female looking at 
a soldier’s uniform. This two-minute sequence is the only hint of backstory or 
motivation we are permitted. The scene then cuts to the same woman in a barren room. 
She picks up, unsheathes and then replaces a small sword. After some contemplation, 
the eight-minute sequence cuts, only to return to precisely the same scene. This time, 
the woman disrobes to the waist, caressing her torso. After five minutes has elapsed, 
she again unsheathes the knife, delicately wraps half the blade in cloth, and strokes the 
tip across her torso. The film has reached the twenty-minute mark before she stabs 
herself in the abdomen. She then writhes in agony for nearly 25 minutes. The third 
scene lasts 34 minutes in total, and contains only 28 instances of editorial intervention, 
all of which are jump cuts. Given that the set-up does not change, the purpose for these 
cuts seems to be to allow the effects crew to add more blood. The final shot is of the 
woman’s corpse. 
Because these films contain fetishized images of bloodshed, they straddle a generic 
boundary, and have been received as niche pornographic films.2 Having purchased them 
from Unearthed Films (who specialize in horror rather than pornography), my response 
to them has been shaped by this contextualization. I will therefore refer to them as 
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objects of horror rather than discussing the potential sexual (and accompanying 
orientalist) connotations of their being sold in America.3 
The starting point for this article was based on my initial response to the films. By 
centralizing suffering, not offering contextualization via plot, and offering little in the 
way of editing or compositional variation to distract the viewer, the films made for 
uncomfortable viewing. The presence of the camera recording an intimate performance 
of death concerned me, as did the duration of the torture. I felt implicated in the 
characters’ suffering; in refusing to turn off the film, I felt that I was situating myself as a 
kind of accomplice or optical murderer, as if the sadistic gaze Mulvey (1975) posited in 
‘Visual pleasure and narrative cinema’ had reached a pinnacle: that here the scrutiny of 
the gaze appeared in some sense to facilitate the suffering of the protagonists, 
becoming the only entertainment these films offer. Instead of occupying a traditional 
role of kaishaku – that is, ‘“to attend”’ the harakiri to lessen the victims’ ‘long drawn-out 
agony’ (Seward 1968: 61) – my presence as spectator (and my inability to hinder the 
anguish) seemed to me to add to the degradation of the victim. As Mayerfield contends, 
‘when other beings do not act to relieve our suffering, but are themselves the source of 
it, our hope is *…+ metamorphosed into its opposite *…+ The helping human presence on 
which we had counted has become a tormenting presence’ (1999: 90). This is the role I 
felt I was willingly undertaking as witness to suffering for my entertainment.  
The primary source of my own discomfort arose from how prolonged the agony seemed 
to be. I began to contemplate how these films differed from the conventional modes of 
depicting suffering that I and viewers of mainstream horror are used to. Even the 
alleged ‘excesses’ of torture porn (see Cochrane 2007; Queenan 2007) feel brief 
compared with these Harakiri films’ renditions of atrocity, because those Hollywood 
studio films employ editorial interventions, narrative arc and expected conventions 
regarding the length of the film (between 90 and 120 minutes on average) (Durie et al. 
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2000: 29). Hostel (Eli Roth, 2005), for example, conforms to these generic modes, while 
the films of the Harakiri cycle seem to actively eschew those tropes. The repetition of 
prolonged suffering across this cycle (not to mention the objectification of the 
protagonist’s pain) makes this cycle a true contender for the category torture porn (as 
Sarrachino and Scott 2008: 161, among others, aver). This is consolidated by the dual 
status of the films as straddling the genres of horror and pornography.  
A series of questions arose for me while I watched these films, which grew in intensity 
as I progressed through the series: at the centre was ‘Why am I watching this? What 
kind of entertainment does this offer?’ One answer is concerned with the pleasures that 
can be derived from any horrific depiction; as Sontag argues, ‘*t+here is the satisfaction 
of being able to look at the image without flinching. There is the pleasure of flinching’ 
(2003: 37). I could not shake the feeling that the endurance required to sit through 
these segments of suffering was an intentional parallel for the agony of the protagonist, 
particularly since the ‘teasing’ that constitutes the first half of each film seems to serve 
the function of drawing the spectator in. The promise of inevitable action is offered, and 
is inevitably fulfilled with aplomb in the second half of each film. A further question I 
began to contemplate was concerned with what I could learn from these films about my 
desire for narrative action. Ultimately, I found myself willing the victims’ deaths because 
it quickly becomes apparent that suffering is all that is offered by these films. But, again, 
feeling like some kind of accomplice, this desire for ‘something’ to fill the plot, some 
recognizable movement, poses a moral problem when that ‘something’ is someone’s 
torturous demise, even if it is fictional.  
This article seeks to respond to these films, based on these questions. My central 
concerns revolve around duration and distance. Temporality is central to my response, 
and, as I will go on to outline, the prolonged duration of the torture has led me to 
consider not the conventions of representing agony per se, but the ways in which the 
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content solely constituted by suffering mirrors these films’ formal aspects, and the film 
form more generally. The combination of time and topic raises the question as to what 
the image of death reveals about the death of the image. Blanchot’s assertion that the 
image is a ‘cadaverous presence’ (1989: 156) implies that the image is haunting, 
excessive and zombie-like. Here I will be asking whether fictionalized suicide lays ‘the 
moment’ to waste as well as the victim, and whether the body on-screen is a kind of 
residue of the individual. Suicide positions the self as waste (to be disposed of), but its 
performance and recording means the victim remains hauntingly present, despite her 
apparent death.  
My interests lie in how this cycle of films may bring to our attention aspects of form and 
apparatus that could be overlooked in favour of the ‘extreme’ content. This will allow 
me to scrutinize how the image interacts with, problematizes and is complicated by 
notions of time, as well as a subjective experience of lived and perceived duration. The 
protagonist’s auto-immolation, in my view, is paralleled by a metaphoric, formal death, 
in which each frame ‘kills’ the moment it represents. The protraction of the torture is 
matched by repetition within the cycle, where lengthy static takes are employed as the 
same incident is enacted upon anonymous, isolated bodies. This combination of 
narrative and form allegorizes life’s trajectory to death – the passage of which is the 
central ‘story’ of existence. Despite the fetishization of suffering in these films, it is the 
final extinguishing of life that punctuates the cessation of the narrative.  
In order to dissect these formal concerns, I will first discuss medium in detail. Beginning 
with photography, then film, I will consider how these media record instants in time, 
how film relates to photography in this respect, and how both media have shared a 
history concerned with recording death (fictional or otherwise). One of the implications 
of my argument is that the raison d’etre of both forms – in stilling or extracting 
moments out of the flow of time – is foremost concerned with a kind of death of time, 
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and this is reflected in the persistent thematic relationship between death and 
photographic/filmic representation in this cycle. I will then examine these films to 
identify the connections between form and content, both of which revolve around 
death.  
Here is where the second key term – distance – becomes central. If film and 
photography kill the moment, they do so by extracting an instant out of time, leading to 
a distance between the moment as it happened and the moment as it is recalled via the 
recording. While this is inherent to my early discussions of medium, I will return to the 
issue of distance when discussing the Harakiri films’ centralization of suffering as theme. 
My response to the films connotes that one of the problems I encountered was centred 
on emotional and moral proximity to the action – my inability to hinder the torture, and 
even my unwillingness to do so. In the latter stages of the article, I wish to contemplate 
how the temporal, geographic and fictional spaces separating viewer from character 
speak to problems of the self, particularly where empathy for others and suffering are 
concerned. Entrapment within a body isolates the individual and hinders an ability to 
truly empathize with the pain of others. This, in my reading, is played out in these films 
via the formal isolation of the fictional victim.  
 
Killing time: Photography as death-image 
Before I consider the implications of ‘motion pictures’, I will begin with an investigation 
of cinema’s root element – photography – asking how photography has been discussed 
in terms of its relationships with time and death. This in turn will highlight how cinema 
utilizes movement (which is the focus of the next section). Because of their lack of 
narrative drive and a distinct absence of editorial interference (as I will detail in due 
course), the case study films are akin to photographs of suffering, inasmuch as they 
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depict isolated, decontextualized incidents. Photographic theory will inform my 
discussion by drawing attention to an aspect of image-nature that film (via its continual 
movement) seems to negate.  
Interestingly, photographic theory has more often been concerned with the opposite – 
photography’s ability to seemingly freeze the moment and how this preserves the life of 
that instance rather than killing the moment by apprehending the image. Bazin claimed 
that ‘by providing a defense *sic+ against the passage of time [ – preserving life by 
representing life – photography] satisfied a basic psychological need in man, for death is 
but the victory of time’ (1967: 9–10). Bazin implies that photography halts time, and 
while this is somewhat true of the image itself, he overlooks the fact that the 
photograph, being inseparable from the narrative contexts of those depicted and 
decoding the image, always-already indicates movement and change.  
The motivation underlying photography is to concretize the present for the future in a 
way that memory cannot. Thus, Mulvey’s assertion that ‘*t+he reality recorded by the 
photograph relates exclusively to its moment of registration; that is, it represents a 
moment extracted from the continuity of historical time’ (2006: 13) is only partially true 
– its reality is also of the moment of decoding. The photograph’s representation 
requires that the image is placed in its ‘narrative’ context, and is also contingent on the 
observer’s moment of processing. It therefore belongs to two simultaneous moments 
(one of the instance of the action captured, and one of the moment of decoding). 
Arguably, it is the latter of these conjoining moments (of decoding) that has more 
impact on the interpreted ‘meaning’ of the image, and perhaps this is what Barthes 
meant when he stated, ‘I am the reference of every photograph’ (1980: 84). Banfield 
summates the problem of photographic temporality neatly in her claim that ‘the 
photograph’s moment was now’ (quoted in Mulvey 2006: 57) (rather than ‘was then’). 
Banfield articulates the problematic presentness of the image – which is more 
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accountable to the viewer’s decoding in the present than a stilling of time between two 
separate instances (that depicted, and the moment of decoding).  
Thus, the image is ‘cadaverous’ as Blanchot claims, being of ‘confusion’ and ‘loss’ (1989: 
142–57), occupying a position that renders the present as a future –divergent from the 
present depicted – and as an incident that can never be reclaimed because it is already 
of the past. The image is also of history (1989: 155), again implying that temporality is 
crucial to interpretation. It is for these reasons that Barthes claims each photograph 
(being permanent) signifies the death of the individual depicted; ‘whether or not the 
subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe’ (quoted in Mulvey 2006: 
62).  
The Harakiri cycle manifests that catastrophe by creating images that depict horror in a 
literal sense. Horror is central to what photography is because as Sontag notes, the 
photograph is unique in its ability ‘*t+o catch a death actually happening and embalm it 
for all time’ (2003: 53). Photography has been commonly employed for precisely this 
reason; death-mask photography, for instance, was common practice in the nineteenth 
century (see Henning 2004). Yet, Barthes further recognizes that the depicted party is 
horrifically already dead (literally or figuratively) because of the future implied by the 
permanent present of the photograph. The subject of the photo embodies his or her 
own going-to-die, whether it has literally passed or not, because the recording of his or 
her existence implies that there will be a time when the photo exists and the subject no 
longer does (Barthes 1980: 96). It is the slippery nature of photographic time that makes 
it ‘excessive, monstrous’ (Barthes 1980: 91), and thus an apt mode for representing 
horror in terms of form, even before we have encountered content. 
Read in such a light, Barthes’ description of photographers as ‘agents of Death’ (1980: 
92) implies that photography is a form of representational murder. Images produce 
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‘death while trying to preserve life… Life/Death: the paradigm is reduced to a simple 
click, the one separating the initial pose from the final click’ (1980: 92). It is no accident 
that the camera is described as gun-like here, or that photographic sessions are referred 
to as ‘shoots’. According to Barthes, this moment equally signals suicide – ‘at the end of 
this first death *‘of one whom I love most’+, my own death is inscribed; between the 
two, nothing more than waiting’ (1980: 93). It is in this sense that the theme of self-
mutilation that is played out in the Harakiri films is intertwined with the formal roots of 
photography. This metaphor is exacerbated by the addition of time into the equation; it 
is for this reason that I will consider film (photograms in motion) according to this same 
paradigm. 
 
Running out of time: Cinema and the mo[ve]ment of death 
If photographs resurrect the past as an Uncanny present, the subject becomes a 
doppelgänger, or more accurately a zombie: ‘in the case of photographing corpses […] 
the photograph then becomes horrible […] because it certifies, so to speak, that the 
corpse is alive, as corpse: it is the living image of a dead thing’ (Barthes 1980: 78–79). 
Mulvey follows suit with her assertion that ‘*t+he photograph’s freezing of reality *…+ 
marks a transition from the animate to the inanimate, from life to death. The cinema 
reverses the process, by means of an illusion that animates the inanimate frames of its 
origin’ (2006: 15). Here I will discuss how cinema exacerbates some of the problems 
posed by its photographic forebear, film’s relationship with photography, and what the 
illusion of movement inherent to film adds to the theoretical discussion of 
photography’s relationships with time and death.  
There can be no doubt that cinema and photography share a kinship, even if their mode 
of displaying images is differentiated by the illusions of time and motion. As Stewart 
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puts it, ‘[p]hotographs are taken from time. Movies take time…But it takes photographs 
to make a movie’ (1999: 1). While Sontag refers to photography as ‘testify*ing+ to time’s 
relentless melt’ and allowing us to ‘participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, 
vulnerability, mutability’ because of its ‘freezing’ of time (1979: 15), I argue that 
cinema’s ‘moving pictures’ are more apposite to manifest the problem she describes 
because film inherently places stress on metamorphosis. Minute changes occurring 
between photogram frames give rise to the illusion of movement. It is precisely because 
of this fantasy that cinema is able to embody the vulnerability and mortality that Sontag 
refers to, and these themes are mirrored in the victimizing content of the Harakiri cycle 
that shows life slipping into death. Perhaps these films then evince Bazin’s argument 
that ‘film is no longer content to preserve the object, enshrouded as it were in an 
instant *…+ now the image of things is likewise the image of their duration, change 
mummified’ (1967: 14–15).  
It is this problem on which my analysis hinges. Coming first from the perspective of the 
still image, we can see that filmic motion is a falsity that is magnified by hiding its 
immobile parts. Of course, this may itself parallel the way in which life (via an emphasis 
on incidents) masks the static truth of death. As Mulvey asserts, ‘cinema combines […] 
two human fascinations: one with the boundary between life and death and the other 
with the mechanical animation of the inanimate, particularly the human, figure’ (2006: 
11), which again may be understood as a kind of resurrection of the dead (or 
zombification). Stewart considers this paradox of stillness and movement to be integral 
to what motion pictures are: ‘the film medium owes a more immediate – rather than 
just historical or mechanical – debt to the photograph than we can ever (quite) see on-
screen… movies are their difference from photographs one after the other’ (1999: 4). 
The order of frames on the film strip and differences between concurrent images 
suggest a certain inevitability that is paralleled by the victim’s movement towards death 
Originally published in: 
Journal of Japanese and Korean Cinema 
Volume 2, Number 2 
© 2011 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. DOI: 10.1386/jjkc.2.2.163_1 
 
11 
 
on-screen in the Harakiri cycle. The inexorable forward motion of film is akin to the 
journey from life to death, and as such, metaphorically forces the on-screen victim to 
die. Hence, according to Jean Cocteau, the camera ‘film*s+ death at work’ (Burgin 1996: 
85) – which may be further expounded by Barthes’ assertion that ‘everything which 
happens within the frame dies absolutely once this frame is passed beyond’ (Barthes 
1980: 57).  
But we should also address the past/present question if we are discussing cinema as 
‘photographs + time’. Much like the photograph, the film is of the present in which it is 
observed/decoded, while also being of the past (the present recorded on the film strip 
in the moment it was filmed). The future is also implicated inasmuch as the event can 
only be witnessed in retrospect. Yet, because of the speed at which each frame passes 
in film (which gives rise to the illusion of movement), the image always ‘dies’ on-screen 
before the brain can apprehend it. In this sense, the image only lives in the spectator, 
not on-screen. The moving image is always dying because it is moving, and is replaced 
24 times every second. Film is then arguably less guilty of Blanchot’s idolization of the 
image (1989: 79) than photography because the ‘permanence’ of the moving image is 
continually refuted by the fleeting presence of the photograms on-screen, and the 
temporal dimension that gives the film object a transience that photography seeks to 
overcome through stasis. It is the movement of film that is integral to its complexity – as 
Rodowick has it, ‘*t+he movement-image provides only an indirect image of time 
because time is reduced to intervals defined by movement and the linking of 
movements through montage’ (1997: 11), and it is difference between each frame and 
the one that preceded it that allows us to perceive movement.  
Its montage of photographs is an aspect of film that the form seeks to negate via 
movement. Again, film, in this respect, reflects our lived experience of time. As 
Rodowick observes, ‘*t+he present is a constantly moving division of the future into the 
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past…*we cannot+ grasp the present and distinguish it absolutely from that past it has 
already become, and the future it is too rapidly overtaking’ (1997: 125), and therefore, 
‘in spite of these residual “memories” of stillness within movement, the relation 
between the aesthetics of cinema and mobility is transcended by the camera, by editing 
and ultimately by narrative, all of which tend to disguise the other side of the divide’ 
(Mulvey 2006: 68). While I will address the ways in which form mirrors content in my 
next section, it is worth noting that the Harakiri cycle accentuates the duration of the 
suffering undergone by the on-screen victim contrary to Mulvey’s suggestions, offering 
little in the way of narrative and editing. Thus, in my case study, the problems of 
movement and temporality are horrifically present, or are not suppressed enough in the 
conventional senses. Before I look more closely at the form/content issue, I will first 
address the philosophical problem alluded to by this lost movement – the death of the 
photogram and the moment it represents via ‘ocular suppression in the apparatus’ 
(Stewart 1999: 5): that is, a willingness to forsake the individual frames in favour of the 
illusory movement offered by film. 
Film’s movement is a source of discomfort inasmuch as it is an illusion well understood 
by the viewer, even if enjoyment of the motion of movies is contingent on overlooking 
the trickery involved. The discomfort can only be overcome by halting (taking control 
over) the image – in this sense, all films, by nature of their movement-illusion, are 
horror films. This desire is asserted technologically (as is the inspiration for Mulvey’s 
2006 book Death 24x a Second) by advances that allow viewers to readily halt the 
movement of the image, especially in a digital age. But pausing is also a source of 
tension, because the film kinetically waits to restart. 
Just as time cannot truly be halted, its direction cannot be altered, just as the path 
towards death is an inexorable element of human experience because of time’s motion. 
While Barthes states that ‘*p+hotography’s noeme will therefore be: “That-has-been”, or 
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again: the Intractable…it has been here, and yet is immediately separated; it has been 
absolutely, irrefutably present, and yet already deferred’ (1980: 77), this is more clearly 
true of film, which combines the movement of time with forward motion – in the 
Harakiri cycle, this motion is from life to death. Form thus mirrors the causal path that 
Barthes finds befitting of photography’s relationship with time (which continues despite 
the image’s attempt to freeze it).  
Time is defined by change (i.e. the changing of states from a to b, whatever those 
criteria might be). If there were no change then humans would not be able to 
distinguish the passage of time. This is why the progression of images captured on the 
film strip appears to so naturalistically parallel lived experience of time. The films here 
do not make use of stills or deceleration (slow motion) to accentuate the torture, or 
disrupt time. They simply let the pain play as it would. The underlying horror is not just 
to do with the paradox of stilling time in photography, but of reality itself, and its 
passage. Barthes suggests that in the age of the photo ‘everything […] prepares our race 
[…] to be no longer able to conceive duration’ (1980: 93). The film-makers mediate as 
little as possible, instead letting the movement in the frame do all the work: in doing so, 
I contend, the apparent duration of the torture is augmented.  
 
Present/presence and Past/passed 
Having outlined the theoretical premises on which my analysis hinges, and having 
explained the problems inherent to photographic and filmic imagery of concern to my 
analysis, I now turn to the case study films themselves. My primary concern is to expand 
on the ways in which form and content mirror each other in the Harakiri cycle, 
underscoring the horrific nature of the cinematic image I have already delineated. The 
creation of the image ‘kills’ the moment inasmuch as the woman on-screen enacts this 
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‘death’ as a literal bodily massacre. As she strokes the blade for the first half of each 
film, she is signalled to be inevitably doomed or marked as already dead, just as the 
previousness of the performed and recorded event has. Perception of the event after 
the fact is not just a matter of witnessing the act in retrospect – the film plays out the 
past ‘as’ present (due to the immediacy of the movement on-screen). While each frame 
captures and makes her death permanent, the form also marks the moment as infinitely 
replayable. The illusion of extracting the moment of death from the original space–time 
context of its performance (it has been ‘captured’ on film, and belongs more to the 
context in which it is replayed than the context of recording) itself seems violent, 
metaphorically murdering the moment, while also preserving it for posterity.4 
As I have already outlined, the filmic form utilizes movement in a manner that can be 
read as symbolizing the directional thrust of life to death. The passage of 24 still frames 
per second across the screen parallels the blood draining from the protagonist’s body. 
Read in this way, the pulse of the projected frames becomes a cinematic contusion – 
just as the blood vacates her body and leads to her death, the film voyages from a 
narrative point of origin to the ‘end’. The narrative is constituted solely by her 
performance of suffering, each film comprising lengthy, fixed static shots. The lack of 
editorial ‘cutting’ draws further attention to her eviscerated body as a formal device – 
minimal violence is done to the scene in terms of editorial intervention, while maximum 
damage is done to her body (even if one stab is enough to kill her). Where editing is 
used (violent jump cuts) it stands out, just as the violence done to her body is the sole 
purpose of the text (standing in for plot). 
In connecting movement/image to the deconstructed, dying, bleeding body, I am 
suggesting that both movement and image are finite and transient – this is accentuated 
by the series’ privileging of form over narrative, and the repetition of event across the 
cycle of films. That such central concerns should be articulated through a cycle of almost 
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identical films is not surprising given Freud’s conception of ‘the compulsion to repeat’ 
that is a fundamental facet of human psychology, especially because of the death 
content here. The ‘picture which life presents to us’ (that is formally presented as a 
series of moving pictures here) ‘is the result of the concurrent and mutually opposing 
action of Eros [including “the instincts for self preservation”+ and the death instinct’ 
(Freud 1995: 36, original emphasis; see also 1995: 645–47). Freud contends that the 
death instinct is founded on an acknowledgement that death is inevitable, balanced 
with a desire to attain this state. The Harakiri cycle literalizes that aspect of death drive 
by focusing on suicide. Eros is the pleasure of life embodied in a wish to extend life (and 
thus experience more pleasure) – which is an impossibility that the finitude of film 
attests to. Eros also causes the death instinct to become outwardly destructive – 
projected towards the external world rather than the self. The ritualized suicide film 
appropriately manifests this problem via its crossing of the private/public boundary.  
While these films may be read according to these psychoanalytic paradigms, the lack of 
narrative content bears consideration – as Sontag has it, ‘*n+arratives make us 
understand. Photographs do something else: they haunt us’ (2003: 80). Again, it is worth 
considering that these films play more like motion photographs than fiction narratives 
because they de-emphasize narrative context. In this sense, the moment is dead – it has 
no cause–effect driving motion (story), only suffering. This is accompanied by the 
knowledge that fictional narratives are only ever substitutes for the uber-narrative of 
the movement of life to death. That the Harakiri cycle offers a collection of films rather 
than a single movie emphasizes this point. The death spectacle is all the films offer us, 
and thus the entire weight of the image rests on on-screen demise, not stories that 
contextualize the characters.  
It is not the photograms themselves, but the movement in which the individual 
photograms are lost that signals ‘the present’ in film. Like memories, the specific 
Originally published in: 
Journal of Japanese and Korean Cinema 
Volume 2, Number 2 
© 2011 Intellect Ltd Article. English language. DOI: 10.1386/jjkc.2.2.163_1 
 
16 
 
moments that constitute that story are divorced snapshots – single frames, only 
apparently connected by illusory movement. The insistence of this message of 
disconnection is emphasized by the presence of six films in the cycle, and the lack of 
context surrounding any of these characters’ voyages into oblivion. The characters are 
near-identical yet solipsistic, and are comparable to the single (only fractionally 
different) frames that depict the victims in each film. 
If the intangible, ever-vanishing presence of the photogram is an inescapable part of 
film’s formal design, again it matches the horror-content of the Harakiri cycle. As Scarry 
contends, ‘the most crucial fact about pain is its presentness’ (1985: 9, original 
emphasis). The photogram is at once present yet also past (passed), each frame vacating 
the screen before it has been registered by the viewer’s mind. As subject matter, pain is 
at odds with film’s reliance on chronology – if pain is present, recording makes it of the 
past, and this fundamentally contradicts the nature of suffering. 
The difficulty is in articulating the past movement into the future via language or image 
(film or photography) as both image and language are used to fix meaning – to record, 
to ascertain, to imbue – which is contrary to the nature of time’s flow. The imagery of 
pain here is vital (as is the fact that it defies narrative), for as Scarry avers, pain’s 
‘resistance to language […] is essential to what it is’; it ‘centrally entail*s+, require*s+ this 
shattering of language’ (1985: 5). Because pain is beyond language, films of suffering are 
apt to articulate the quandary posed by time: film is reliant on continual movement, 
while horror fiction (especially when presented as real) connotes that it is impossible to 
capture the terror of presence/the present. The Harakiri cycle also rewrites and 
reconstitutes the body by portraying it only as an object that suffers. According to 
Mayerfield, ‘*i+n severe pain, we are deprived of the world. Our pain begins to occupy all 
our thoughts, and to the extent we remain conscious of any other reality, it seems to us 
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disconnected, unintelligible, false, empty, absurd’ (1999: 26, fn 31). This is expressed by 
these films, which isolate their victims, and lack plot – form is taken over by anguish.  
The fundamental problem of articulating pain (or any other emotional state) is that the 
image cannot fully encapsulate inner experience, since it is removed – it observes. This 
is similar to our lived experience of selfhood and empathy, as an individual can never 
truly know or be the Other; as Mayerfield contends, ‘*b+ecause they are another 
person’s feelings and not our own, we cannot peer into them directly’ (1999: 55). This 
effect is augmented by each character’s isolation as the sole focus of each film. 
However, while the protagonist is the only point of identification provided, I contend 
that the formal design of the film, which excludes other characters, dialogue and 
editorial intervention, exacerbates the character’s remoteness. The film frame’s two-
dimensional approximation of reality, the geographic and temporal distance between 
viewer and enacted event, the fictionality of the performance, and the illusion of 
movement (the suppression of the apparatus) all distance the viewer from the 
character.  
This is also reflected in her isolation on the film strip; individual frames imprison her as 
much as her body does. The ‘invisible’ black lines that separate the photograms from 
one another on the film strip metaphorically reflects the victim’s position – the 
separation between life and death that is played out in each film. Furthermore, the 
borders between frames symbolize the invisibility of pain, which is inadequately 
represented by the excessive carnage on display. The gratuity of the representation 
cannot convey an abstract emotional state such as pain, no matter how intimate the 
framing is (individualizing her as the sole point of focus during an ultra-personal/private 
ritual). The form allows a spectator to witness the performance, but the lack of 
situational, contextual and narrative information (which is what makes the Harakiri 
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cycle more akin to photographic extracts of time than narrative films) hinders emotional 
connection. 
Even though the spectator is distanced from the victim depicted, the image is a bridging 
point – it is contained in the mind of the viewer, and decoded according to the viewer’s 
own frame of experience. The fictional victim is at best a symbolic entity, and is as 
incapable of manifesting pain as the film or photograph is of possessing abstract 
concepts such as suffering (Parent 1990: 205–11). Scarry views the problem from the 
perspective of the state (pain) rather than the image that depicts suffering; ‘pain only 
becomes an intentional state once it is brought into relation with the objectifying power 
of the imagination’ (1985: 164). While direct empathy with fictional suffering is made 
difficult by a number of formal distances, it is entirely plausible that the viewer may 
understand the character’s distress because of the nature of decoding, which hinges on 
relating depiction or description to the decoder’s experiences; ‘my past experience […] 
gives me an idea of how I would feel even though I never occupied the same exact state’ 
(Mayerfield 1999: 56).  
Portrayal of pain constitutes the content of each film, and this has motivated my reading 
of the films in relation to form and photography primarily because of how pain is 
psychologically experienced. The memory does not adequately bring to mind the 
sensation of pain, even if one has experienced prolonged periods of suffering. As 
Mayerfield has it, pain and terror are eventually forgotten; ‘the actual experience 
leaches out’ of our memory (1999: 87). Like film, pain is transient. In this sense, the films 
of the Harakiri cycle seek to document a performance of suffering, and successfully 
articulate the distances inherent to witnessing and remembering pain via their fictional 
and ritualized (constructed) nature, the prolonging of the agony and the repetition 
across the cycle.  
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The ‘I’ in ‘Die’: A conclusion 
Severed-Cinema describes Sunohara’s cycle thus: ‘bla, bla, bla, the 20 minute mark hits 
and we get our initial close up cut scene of her stomach. Finally!...she considers “should 
I, or shouldn’t I”, as if to bring the viewer suspense (tedium)’ (Mayo 2008). While the 
reviewer may come across as callous in his or her desire for torture, I can sympathize 
with this position, not least since the films promise horror but purposefully seek to delay 
its occurrence. My concern here has been to recognize that this response reveals much 
about how I have been conditioned by my expectations of narrative cinema and the 
horror genre. If read as artistic avant-garde statements – and the involvement of sound 
noise artist Merzbow (aka Akita Masami) as director of part of this cycle may suggest 
they should be interpreted as art – the films may be more sympathetically received than 
they were by the reviewer cited above.  
However, having subjected the films to a kind of distanced formal dissection, it is worth 
returning to my opening conjectures – the discussion of pleasure sought and frustration 
felt. Perhaps in undertaking a formal analysis I have sought to retreat to science to 
evade the spectacle of suffering,5 to avoid answering the questions I set myself in the 
introduction. Even if this is the case, such a position marries with the point at which I 
have arrived regarding distances wrought between viewer and depiction, which are for 
me intertwined with the formal distances of filming and photography. 
Sontag observes that ‘Shock can become familiar… one can become habituated to the 
horror of certain images’ (2003: 73), and this is not only true of the prolonging of torture 
in any given chapter of the series, but the repetitious nature of the cycle itself. The 
shock for me when watching these films was not based upon the violent content – the 
twenty-minute sequences of squirming and writhing on-screen – but on my inability to 
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sympathize with the atrocity depicted, and my willingness to enter into a contract of 
atrocity with the on-screen victim as agent of her suffering. I may have been seeking to 
excuse that such a failure ‘of imagination, of empathy’ positions me as ‘a moral 
monster’ (Sontag 2003: 7). The latter would be truer if the depictions were of real 
suffering rather than a fictional performance. Yet, it is worth paralleling the fictionality 
of the text with an inability to empathize with off-screen responses to others’ pain. As 
Scarry avers, for the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that 
‘having pain’ may be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is to ‘have 
certainty’, while for the other person it is so elusive that ‘hearing about pain’ may exist 
as the primary model of what it is ‘to have doubt’. (1985: 4) 
One cannot fully relate to another person’s pain, and the fictionality of the agony in my 
case study films manifests that ‘doubt’, tying visual cruelty or lack of empathy in viewing 
practices to the formal structure of the images. Finally, then, the fictional status of the 
films (depicting events that did not ‘really’ exist, even if they were recorded by the 
camera) alludes to, I contend, a separation of fantasy and reality that parallels the 
past/present and movement/stasis illusions of film, all of which attempt to create a 
state of ‘seeming to be’.  
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1 For discussions of the significance and ritualization of harakiri see Seward (1968) and 
Suematsu (1905). 
2 Indeed, the reviews of the films on Severed-Cinema.com and AVManiacs.com directly 
deem them to be a type of fetish porn (see Mayo 2008; Jane 2009).  
3 It should be noted that this small cycle of films is not alone in depicting the self-
sacrifice of females, especially in the context of Japanese extreme horror: see also Satsu 
satsu (ayame) (Anaru Tamakichi, 1999) and Watashi no akai harawata (hana)/Women’s 
Flesh: My Red Guts (Anaru, 1999). While the potentially misogynistic and orientalist 
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connotations of these films would benefit from analysis, as would their situation within the cultural 
contexts of Japan, I do not have space to do so here. 
4 Note that throughout I will refer to suicide victims in these films as she/her (singular) – 
they behave and are framed in the same way in each film, meaning that there is not a 
great deal that makes them distinguishable. 
5 I am particularly indebted to Chuck Kleinhans for his commentary on an early draft of 
this article, especially for raising this concern. 
